This lecture sketches the contours of a political -legal theory of terrain. It argues that terrain is a useful concept to think the materiality of territory. Terrain is where the geopolitical and the geophysical meet, and it is therefore a helpful concept to make political -legal understandings of territory better account for the complexities of the geophysical.
some blurring of the two in indeterminate and dynamic environments such as rivers, estuaries, marshes and swamps, glaciers, and sea ice. I am concerned with developing a political theory of terrain, which takes into account legal questions, alongside economic, strategic, technical and scientific ones.
Terrain, in this expanded sense makes possible, or constrains, various military-strategic projects. We can find examples of terrain analysis as far back as the earliest military-strategic texts. Julius Caesar's Gallic War is one example of how a military commander views a landscape, with space as a strategic and contested medium, rather than a passive backdrop or simply the stake of struggle. 10 Several centuries later Niccolò Machiavelli suggests that political rulers should make the effort to study terrain in order both to defend their own and be better placed to conquer that of others. He says that hunting is a good process for 'becoming familiar with the terrain [la natura de' siti]: how mountains rise, how valleys and plains spread, the characteristics of rivers and swamps'.
11
Military geography has frequently looked at the physical constraints to military action, and a number of studies of military campaigns have analysed these factors. 12 There is, however, little conceptual discussion in much of this work. Doyle and Bennett suggest that terrain 'encompasses both the physical aspects of earth's surface, as well as the human interaction with them'. 13 While they stress the human-terrain interaction, at times terrain seems to be landscape devoid of life. This sense can be found, at its extreme, when the targeting of cities is discussed without reference to those living within them, 14 or when terrain is reduced from a concrete materiality to a level of virtuality. 15 Recent events, from Fallujah to Aleppo, from Raqqa to Mosul, through to drone strikes, illustrate the targeting of spaces in this way. More recently the US Army has run a programme called Human Terrain System (HTS), which used social scientists to help the army understand the local population of areas in which they were operating. As the Human Terrain Team Handbook argues:
A fundamental condition of irregular warfare and counter-insurgency operations is that the Commander and staff can no longer limit their focus to the traditional Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, friendly Troops and support available, and Time. The local population in the area of conflict must be considered as a distinct and critical aspect of the Commander's assessment of the situation. 16 'Human terrain' was therefore defined as 'the human population in the operational environment (area of operations) as defined and characterized by sociocultural, anthropologic and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human population and society '. 17 What is interesting here is that the geophysical (terrain) and the population (human terrain) are clearly distinguished, in such a way that the programme fully focuses on the latter, assuming that the former is addressed by a more traditional military strategy. The programme ran from 2007 to 2014, and was strongly opposed by academic groups, notably the American Anthropological Association.
18 Given its focus is exclusively on the non-traditional sense of terrain, I will not add to such discussion, though it is intriguing that it adopts the word.
P O L I T I C S , L A W A N D T E R R A I N
The geo-strategic elements of terrain are therefore fairly well examined, but the concept has yet to receive sustained attention within political geography. 19 Neither has it been a focus in academic work in political theory or international relations, nor indeed in public international law. This neglect is surprising, because terrain is crucial to understanding the political practice of territory. Terrain is the very land and sea divided into different political-legal regimes, and indeed those regimes divide not just states from each other, but also consecrate the geophysical and geopolitical divide between land and sea. Yet, with partial exceptions, territory has often been seen in fully abstract terms, separating the political-legal control of areas from their physical and material state, and where it accounts for terrain this is detached from the processes which shape and transform it. These shortcomings are highlighted in perhaps two of the most interesting recent political theoretical accounts of territory and the border-Margaret Moore's A Political Theory of Territory and Thomas Nail's A Theory of the Border.
20 Nail does not say much at all about the physical landscape divided into territories by borders. He briefly mentions the dynamic nature of geophysical features: 'the movement of rivers, the shifting sands and tides along coastlines, the emergence and destruction of ocean islands, volcanic transformations of mountain ranges and valleys, the redistribution of the soil itself through erosion and deposition caused by wind and water, and even the vegetative shifting of tree lines, desertification and climate changes'. 21 That, aside from some uncritical remarks on the idea of 'natural borders', is all there is in the major, theoretical part of his book. 22 When he comes to the final part, which is a detailed discussion of the US-Mexico border in all its political, historical and geographical richness and complexity, he does make some more comments. an application of political theory to territory. If we know what territory is, and here it is described as essentially 'land over which some agent has political authority, meaning authority to make and enforce laws governing the conduct of inhabitants on the land, including laws defining and delimiting property rights', 25 then we can apply debates in (legal and) political theory-justice, property, rights, obligations etc-to it. Moore says that she began the book by lamenting 'the lack of a theory of territory'. Her approach to dealing with this was 'to address this lacuna, by advancing a theory that justifies rights over territory, both against those who think territorial rights cannot be justified and those who think they can, but who offer a different theory'. 26 She therefore defends the idea of territory and territorial rights in terms of self-determination and argues:
that this provides an intuitively plausible explanation of the relationship between territory, the state, and people, and that it justifies (within limits) those elements that we normally associate with territorial rights: rights of jurisdiction, rights over resources, rights to control borders, and so on.
27
The book essentially offers a 'normative theory' of territorial rights.
28
As sophisticated as its use of those debates around rights is, Moore's work pays little regard to complexities around its putative object of analysis. 29 Indeed she references almost none of the literature on territory from outside her own discipline. This lecture is part of a wider project which seeks to develop an understanding of territory not bound by those limitations. It is worth underlining that I do not fully exclude my own previous work from criticisms of a lack of attention to materiality. In previous work I have argued that territory should be understood not as a simple bounded area, but in multiple registers. 34 Territory is political and geographical certainly, but these are bundled together with economic, strategic, legal and technical notions. The complicated and nuanced understanding of the legal, and its attendant techniques of rules and regulations; and more obvious technical techniques such as planning, surveying, mapping, engineering, logistics, operations, regulating and so on, are one of the reasons why I suggested we could think of territory as a political technology, or a bundle of political technologies. Technologies embrace not just the technical, but a wider framework of activities, legal regimes, practices and so on.
35
Territory is a process not an outcome, and it is a stake in political struggles rather than just their container. In seeing territory as a political technology, my 35 Gregory has proposed a '(bio)political technology', stressing the bodies-in-space which, he suggests, I have rather neglected: D Gregory, 'The Territory of the Screen' 6 MediaTropes (2016) 126, 131. While I accept the criticism of my neglect, I think that if any development of the term 'political technology' is necessary, it should be '(bio-geo)political technology', the bio-and the geo-being the parallel aspects of the political in this sense. Indeed, Foucault uses political technology to discuss population; my point is that it can encompass the territory as well. intention was to look at the entangled and multi-faceted relations in the production, transformation and contestation of territory. This work led to a contemporary, political book-Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty-and a historical, conceptual one-The Birth of Territory. 36 In this work I suggested that while land and terrain were crucial to an understanding of territory, if those were understood narrowly in terms of the politicaleconomic and political-strategic dimensions of space they were, alone, insufficient. In those earlier works, therefore, I privileged the political-legal and political-technical registers as important supplements to the traditional, narrow understandings of territory. As intentionally expansive as this work was, there are still other elements which need to be explored. 37 The next stage is to interrogate the relation between the geophysical and the geopolitical. This work relates to some brief but intriguing remarks made by Bob Jessop in The State: Past, Present, Future, where he suggests that territory 'should not be confused with the more generic notion of terra-"the terrestrial" (which encompasses "land" in its broadest sense, i.e., land and the subterranean, the sea, its depths and seabed, the air above, and outer space)-which provides a variable, technologically conditioned, and relational "raw material" of territorialization as a specific political process'. 38 Jessop is correct that territory is not the same as terra or the terrestrial, and he has an expanded sense of the latter, but in much work the terra is not taken into account at all. As he develops later in the same work:
Let me just recall the distinction between the terrestrial and the territorial. Whereas the former denotes the initial geophysical raw material or substratum for sociospatial relations (and becomes 'second nature' through its sociospatial transformation), territorialization is one form of the sociospatial appropriation and transformation of the terrestrial. Thus, while all social relations occur in terrestrial space (until the rise of telematic or cyberspace), not all social relations occur in territories constituted and controlled by a state apparatus. 
T H E M A T E R I A L I T Y O F T E R R I T O R Y
The materiality of territory is usually understood in terms of the built landscape of walls, fences, ditches, tunnels, roads, road-blocks and cleared vistas that states construct and transform. While most of those maybe at the borders of states, 40 the built landscape of territory extends throughout the entire fabric of the state. This is the continual making and remaking of territory; what others, following Deleuze and Guattari have called, de-and re-territorialisation. But we can also think of these as state-spatial strategies; and more specific state-territorial strategies; and resistances to them. This brings in important issues of embodiment and corporeality; of bodies in places and places embodied. But the materiality of territory would also be the (geo)physical landscape. We can think of borders which use landmarks such as mountain crests, rivers, coastlines, deserts. While the idea of these being 'natural borders' has long been discredited, that should not be taken to reduce the importance of the use of physical features of the landscape in marking political divisions. 41 The US-Mexico border combines the use of built features such as the wall and fences, roadblocks, checkpoints and surveillance equipment, with an effective use of the terrain of the desert as a barrier. At certain points the wall itself ends, with objects designed to prevent vehicular access. Without a vehicle people would not get very far: the desert and rocky terrain becomes part of the border, itself a weapon against migration, in a similar way to how Frontex has effectively turned the Mediterranean into Europe's southern border. The aim of interrogating terrain is to make work on territory account more fully for this materiality. All attempts at fixing boundaries and shaping territories are complicated by dynamic features of the Earth, including rivers, oceans, polar regions, glaciers, airspace and the sub-surface-both the subsoil and the sub-marine. As has long been known, rivers are dynamic features of the landscape, not static ones. They do not necessarily run where we want them to, or stay where they were. It is not possible to fix a geopolitical order without due attention to the complexity of the geophysical.
This has long been recognised. Some political theory, such as the physiocrats' emphasis on soil, or Montesquieu's interest in climate and geography, shows an attention to such matters. 42 In public international law there are some important moments when geophysical features do explicitly matter in relation to jurisdictional relations. Examples would include the vertical differentiation of sovereign airspace and non-sovereign outer space. Another would be how, in the law of the sea, jurisdictional issues concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the deep seabed are shaped by geophysical knowledge. A third concerns the question of river boundaries. In the Byzantine emperor Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis Romani, three key questions are asked of rivers: What happens if a river changes direction, and land on one side ends up on the other? What happens if an island emerges in the middle of a river? Who owns the rights to a dried-up river-bed? 43 At that time these questions largely concerned property over land, and the relation between farmers, but today similar questions occupy states whose international boundaries were formed by rivers or whose boundaries cut across them. As dynamic earth features, rivers frequently shift position in the landscape. Sometimes the political-legal regime is able to account for this. The case of the 'thalweg' is well known. A thalweg is the deepest point in a river channel. If the river boundary follows this geophysical line, then if the river direction changes, so too does the boundary. 44 There are other instances, however, where the geophysical and the geopolitical no longer coincide. What happens when the geophysical feature, the river, being a dynamic earth feature, shifts from its previous course, and the geophysical and the geopolitical no longer coincide? At the end of November 2016 there was a good example of this. Belgium and Holland have recently agreed to even up the border between their two countries in one small sector. Instead of the river Maase being the boundary between the two countries, as fixed in the 1839 Treaty of London, 45 its current course means that the river course and the boundary diverge. This is not, though, the result of a physical process-it was caused by dredging works in the 1960s and 1970s to make the connection between two canals more straightforward. Belgium will give two small uninhabited peninsulas to Holland (Presqu'ile de L'Ilal and Presqu'ile d'Eijsden, 16 ha), and Holland one smaller one to Belgium (Presqu'ile Petit-Gravier, 3 ha). This will make the geopolitical and the geophysical more neatly coincide. There are some Another recent example is the story of how Norway is considering moving its boundary with Finland by a mere 40 m in order to remedy a slight geophysical anomaly. As a news story in The Guardian puts it:
At 1,324 metres above sea level, the highest point in Finland currently lies on a bleak mountain spur known as Hálditšohkka, part of a far larger fell known as Halti, more than 200 miles inside the Arctic Circle.
Halti's summit, at 1,365 metres high, is a kilometre away in Norway. But moving the border barely 40 metres further up the mountainside would put Hálditšohkka's 1,331-metre summit in Finland-and make the country's highest point seven metres higher.
'Geophysically speaking, Mount Halti has two peaks, one Finnish and one Norwegian,' NRK explained to bemused viewers earlier this year. 'What is proposed is that Norway gives the Finnish peak to Finland, because it is currently in Norway.' 48 The anomaly comes from the overlaying of a geometrical line over a geophysical terrain. The shift was first proposed by a retired geophysicist and government surveyor, Bjørn Geirr Harsson, who has described the existing border as 'geophysically illogical'. However, attempts at this exchange have raised issues of the territorial integrity of Norway, with Article 1 of its constitution stating that the country is a 'free, independent, indivisible and inalienable realm'. 49 For some, this would prevent even such a symbolic gift. Yet minor boundary changes happen frequently:
Øyvind Ravna, a law professor at the Norwegian Arctic university, told the [Aftposten] paper the constitution did not apply to minor border adjustments, pointing out that Norway's borders with both Finland and Russia had moved in recent times to reflect changes in riverbeds and the shifting position of sandbanks and islets.
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As well as the interest of the specific example, this is a further instance of the general dynamic nature of river boundaries. It is worth stressing that the indigenous Saami people do not recognise either state's claim to this land. They see the existence of the border itself, rather than its location, as the problem.
States are therefore conditioned by material elements of their landscapes, even as they seek to transcend and transform them. As Neil Brenner and I have argued in previous work:
Territory enables, facilitates and results from the evolution of state action; and concomitantly, state action produces, facilitates and results from the evolution of territory . . . Territory is always being produced and reproduced by the actions of the state and through political struggles over the latter; yet at the same time, in the modern world, territory also conditions state operations and ongoing efforts to contest them. States make their own territories, not under circumstances they have chosen, but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are confronted. 51 This is a notion that has been wonderfully described as 'the territorial palimpsest' by Thomas Sigler in his work on the Panama Canal. 52 The term 'palimpsest', which originally meant a manuscript scratched out and written again, is also used in geomorphology and archaeology to describe landscape in terms of 'a series of complex and overlying layers', but in which there is a crucial difference from a textual palimpsest, in that 'these layers also interact'. 53 Sarah Dillon has provided a much more general discussion of the history and contemporary uses of the term palimpsest, from literary texts to literary theory.
54
What I think Sigler and others do is provide the potential for using it to make sense of the materiality of territory. Panama itself is intriguing. As Brian Davis, Rob Holmes and Brett Milligan note:
Over the past five hundred years, the Panamanian isthmus has been transformed by a succession of megaprojects: the first colonial European city on the Pacific Coast; the mule trains that moved the plundered silver of Bolivia and Peru to Atlantic ports; the first railroad to cross the continental divide; the failed project to construct a sealevel canal connecting the two oceans; and then the immense complex of locks, dams, artificial lakes, and engineered channels that constitute the Panama Canal, which opened in 1914. 55 The Panama Canal is certainly a perfect example of the shaping and remaking of territory by states and capital. Yet the canal is being further developed to double the capacity of ships which can use it, a project which involves massive chambers with 50-ft thick walls built into the bedrock, and major demands for water to allow ships to pass through locks, which involves the creation of further reservoirs.
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As these examples indicate, there are multiple ways in which states transform their territories: damming rivers for power and water storage; draining swamps; building coastal or riverine fortifications; infrastructure projects; road, rail and canal networks, resource extraction and so on. 57 Physical geographers call this 'anthropogeomorphology', that is, the study of human impact on geomorphology. Historically some of the most important work on this from the perspective of the making and remaking of territory has been by Chandra Mukerji, in two remarkable books. In Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles, she traces the parallel projects of, on the one hand, French court gardens, with their formal layout and land-shaping techniques; and on the other, the military engineering of France as a whole, creating its boundaries, fortifications, canals, forests and landscapes. Mukerji shows how the making of territory could be seen at both the small and large scale, shaping a court garden and a national landscape.
59
In her following book, Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi, she traces the 17th-century project of building a canal linking the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, a king-and court-led but locally built project which demonstrated the transformation of territory and the technical conquest of nature. 60 Originally named Canale Royale des Deux Mers, and built two centuries before the British canal system or the Erie canal, 'it was not technically possible according to the formal engineering knowledge of the period'. 61 This was, in part, because 'at the divide between the Atlantic and Mediterranean watersheds, [the canal] reached 189 meters (620 feet) above sea level'. It required 100 locks to manage this. 62 The amount of digging, tunnelling, earth relocation, bank reinforcement, running water through dry landscapes, hydraulics, bridge, lock, reservoir and holding tank construction and other ancillary building was substantial. As they came to realise, water loss, siltage and degradation of building materials made it a project of continual management, maintenance and repair. 63 Rainwater, floods, drought, sandbars and other challenges arose. 64 Mukerji describes it 'as a silent demonstration of disciplinary power over the earth . . . the cultural power of political territoriality'; 65 though she notes that 'everywhere along the canal the earth and water evaded the control of those who tried to build it, displaying the excess powers that nature could bring to human projects'.
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In order to make such a thing possible, cartographic surveying, land purchase and engineering planning required analysis of the terrain through which it was to cut. 67 But it was also a project of reshaping that terrain. In her terms, strategics required logistics; 68 the political and legal required the scientific and the technical. For Mukerji the project showcased 'a modern logic of territorial administration based on "works" rather than "words"'; 'a matter of territorial governance'. 69 These descriptions certainly fit with my own understanding of a territory. But in the terms being developed in this lecture it was a geopolitical transformation of the geophysical, though still bound by its limitations and conditioned by the available political technologies. More recent accounts include Olivier Razac's political history of barbed wire, which traces how this technology can enclose and produce spaces-from the prairies of the mid-West to the trenches of the First World War to the concentration camps of the Boer war and the Nazi regime.
70 Andrew Barry also traces what he calls 'material politics', focusing on the oil pipeline through the Caucasus, again shaping the physical landscape of the region through its construction, but demonstrating equally how the geophysics and geopolitics of the region acts as a limit to geoeconomic ambitions. 71 There are also parallels in Shiloh Krupar's study of how military and nuclear toxic waste has left a lasting legacy on both bodies and the landscape; a project which shares some similarities with Rachel Woodward's work on military geographies. 72 Rather than the traditional work of military geographies which looks at the impact of the landscape on the military, Woodward reverses the focus, looking at the impact of military presence, from bases to firing and exercise zones, on the environment and landscape. Similarly, Debbie Lisle has examined the interrelation between war, tourism and landscape. 73 It is not just the military: the impact of the gas, oil and coal industries on the landscape is also well known. 74 Environmental devastation is of course a long-standing tactic of military strategy from (possibly apocryphal) tales of the Romans ploughing salt into Carthage's soil, to scorched earth retreats in World War II, Agent Orange in Vietnam and Saddam Hussein's forces burning Kuwaiti oil wells and dumping oil into the Persian Gulf. 75 Both Adam Roberts and Bronwyn Leebaw have noted that the word 'environment' 'did not enter into international humanitarian law until 1976, with the passage of the Environmental Modification Convention in response to outrage over the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam'. 76 Of course, there
were earlier protections of what we would now call the natural environment, but they related, in Roberts's terms, 'obliquely rather than directly'.
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B E Y O N D D R Y L A N D
Territory has also generally been understood in relation to static, dry land. But the land/sea relation complicates some of these ideas. Although many land territories use coastlines as their borders, states also claim significant parts of the sea or ocean. There is an established body of international law on this question-the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 78 But as people like Phil Steinberg have pointed out, this becomes complicated when we look at ice, which can be solid or liquid at different times, blurring both geophysical states and legal regimes. Other geophysical issues also complicate this-coastal swamps or river deltas, glaciers, rivers, marshlands and so on. One of the key issues here is that these are dynamic features of the landscape, and so there are complications when we try to use them to demarcate political-legal regimes, both practically and conceptually. In order to address these complexities, the ICE-LAW project has been established. 79 It is led by Philip Steinberg at Durham University's IBRU:
Centre for Borders Research, and I lead the sub-project on territory. Initially the topic was on 'ice' in a specific sense, and legal issues around it. But in our discussions we moved from just this one object to use ICE as an acronym for 'indeterminate and changing environments', where 'LAW' is now an acronym for 'law, the Anthropocene and the world'. So, while ice is certainly a major focus of the work, and whilst legal questions remain central, we hope that it can encompass a broader range of concerns. It was sparked by some contemporary issues, especially in the Arctic, but there are many instances where questions need to be addressed.
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In the Arctic, states are increasingly trying to map the seabed, and using this as a basis of some of their territorial claims. The question of resources is also sharpening the stakes; there are also environmental issues and the impact of climate change to take into account. Because ice that was previously there yearround is now melting, either entirely or on a seasonal basis, new issues are It has implications in terms of where people can live, migration routes for land and sea animals, the availability of resources and so on. There have been some suggestions that we need an Arctic treaty like the one that applies to the Antarctic, which suspends territorial claims to that continent. But there are at least two crucial differences between the Antarctic and the Arctic. The Arctic has indigenous populations who inhabit the land and ice that is being contested, whereas Antarctica's population is a transient one made up of scientists and environmentalists. And whereas Antarctica is a land mass with an ice sheet above and beyond it, the bulk of what is being contested in the Arctic is ice, open water or a mixture of the two, on a seasonal basis. There are of course land masses within the Arctic, but the borders of those are largely fixed, even if there are remaining disputes. As soon as you look at the water and ice, it becomes much more complicated. IBRU colleagues produced a map of 79 ICE LAW Project, 'Welcome', available at https://icelawproject.org/ (last visited 7 July 2017). Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region a few years ago, recently updated, which shows the various claims to different portions of the region. Like most maps though, this focuses on the surface boundary divisions, which become increasingly complicated if you look below the surface, into mineral resources, the sea and the seabed.
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One of my contributions to the initial workshop of the ICE LAW project was to speak about my work on territory. I began by saying that I was not surprised that people were finding traditional understandings of territory inadequate to understand issues around ice, the sea and so on. The reason I was not surprised was because I thought that traditional understandings were also inadequate in grasping complexities around territory on land. I then tried to outline the approach my work takes and suggested that rather than searching for a fixed definition, itself bounded, controlled and discrete, we would do better to think about the different aspects of territory that were at stake, and let its sense and use emerge from that inquiry. 82 The work of the ICE-LAW project on the geophysical and the material has led me to this current rethinking of my own research on territory, by bringing into prominence the notion of terrain, even as I hope my previous work is useful for others.
T E R R A I N ' S V O L U M E
Terrain is crucial because it combines materiality and strategy-the physical and human dimensions of geography, and the way they complicate political and legal questions. But terrain also requires us to go beyond a narrow, flattened sense of space, what might be called the cartographic imagination. Representations of complex landscapes are frequently reduced to a plane, where shapes meet, separated by a line, a border. In that imagination, not only are complex three-dimensional spaces represented on a two-dimensional surface, but it also fixes earth processes at a single point in time.
Terrain, by its very nature, helps us to break from the flat, surface, areal sense of much of political-legal geography. Yet maps have long tried to grapple with how to represent height and depth on their (usually) two-dimensional surface. Contour lines and relief shading are two of the more common, but as techniques develop, different possibilities emerge. Terrain forces us to account for the complexity of height and depth, the question of volume. Understanding political spaces as volumes, considering and analysing questions of height and depth, of what is above and below the surface, was a crucial development in my work on territory, and will inform the development of a theory of terrain. 83 An extreme example of the state production of space can be seen in the West Bank where the line between civil and military engineering is extremely blurred. Fundamental is the pioneering work of architect Eyal Weizman, who critically analysed the contested spaces of the West Bank and Gaza as threedimensional, in which space is not just where violence occurs, or the stake of the struggle, but the very medium through which it is conducted. 84 This includes both built infrastructure and its interaction with the physical nature of the landscape. This is not just the building of houses in settlements, though their situation on hilltops is an important instance of the relation of terrain. Nor is it just the wall/fence of the 'separation barrier' itself, but also the sundry other civil engineering projects-of the walls and fences, tunnels, bridges, roads, flyovers, roadblocks and checkpoints-that are associated with the administration of the occupied territories. Included here is also the highly political infrastructure of drainage and irrigation pipes and cables. This work is complemented by Stephen Graham's exploration of how a vertical perspective changes how we understand the spaces of a city, building on his earlier work on how cities are made-infrastructure projects-and unmade-targeted and destroyed in war. 85 It can also be complemented by a range of analyses of urban exploration. 86 But much of this work has a focus on the built landscape, and the suggestion here is that we need to push further into the geophysical. In doing so, this work further challenges attempts to restrict terrain solely to land, which is unhelpful in dealing with the complexities of the land-sea interface. As Steinberg and Kimberley Peters suggest, it is important to break from fixed and grounded understandings of matter. Their specific focus is the ocean, seen as a way of engaging with fluidity and flow rather than fixity. The deep oceans have, as technology has developed, become another site for contestation and resource exploitation. 87 Their work acts as a spur for work on terrain to go beyond simple gas-liquid-solid divisions, which arguably structure the land-sea-airspace divide in contemporary political-legal territorial regimes. Such issues are becoming ever more pressing with the impacts of climate change-coastlines are changing; islands are being submerged; glaciers are melting and previously frozen sea routes are becoming open. 88 All these material processes are transforming territory. Taking the measure of these geophysical factors is crucial for a political-legal theory of territory more generally; the 'volumetric'-a term used in cartography and physics-is helpful here, since it grasps the mechanisms of calculating, measuring, surveying, managing, controlling and ordering (the metric) that constitute the political technology of territory, understood as a volume. The volumetric has been used by Klaus Dodds and Mark Nuttall to analyse the contested spaces of the Arctic and Antarctic, especially concerning the contested mapping, exploration and exploitation of the deep-seabed. 89 Rachel Squire has also adopted it to think about Gibraltar, and US undersea bases in the Cold War. 90 We can then speak about volumetric territory or, taking the materiality fully into account, volumetric terrain.
N A T U R E A N D O T H E R M A T E R I A L I T I E S
In his work on 'the natures of war', Derek Gregory proposes a 'corpography' in opposition to the cartographic imaginary-that focuses upon the soldiers' lived experience of military violence compared to an abstract analysis of surveillance, planning and logistics. Accordingly he looks at the biophysical features of warthe interrelation of bodies and spaces in armed conflict-in three material registers: the mud of the First World War, the deserts of North Africa in the Second World War, and the rainforests of Vietnam. 91 Pip Thornton at Royal
Holloway has also written compellingly on her own experience as an army reservist sent to Iraq. 92 Gastó n Gordillo has also suggested that terrain is 'the only spatial category that (in contrast to place, territory, or landscape) evokes material forms, volumes and textures that are not reducible to human control and appropriations'. 93 As
Gordillo suggests: 'terrain's materiality is not reducible to social constructions and can be best understood through a geometrical examination of bodies in motion'. 94 His response when I asked him about this in an interview was revealing:
Yes, I think that the question of terrain is perhaps the last frontier in our conceptions about space, in the sense that whereas we count on a very rich, sophisticated literature on place, space, landscape, or territory, there's very little on terrain. You're in fact one of the very few people who's written about terrain, in particular in relation to territory. And as you know, terrain is usually used vaguely and in passing, as a purely descriptive term. We hear about terrain, for instance, in references to rugged terrains involving military operations, geological surveys, or outdoor activities, but that's all. So my aim is to examine in detail what terrain is, as a concept but also in relation to actual terrains. In our discussions it has become clear that while my analysis of terrain is principally a project to understand the materiality of territory; for him the purpose is to understand terrain in itself.
More broadly, this work connects to wider debates about materiality and the interaction of human and non-human materialities, especially in Karen Barad's and Jane Bennett's pioneering work, 96 but it is also part of wider attempts at rethinking the 'geo' element in the term 'geopolitics'. Elizabeth Grosz has suggested the idea of geopower as a broader frame within which geopolitics operates: 97 The relations between the earth and its various forces, and living beings and their not always distinguishable forces, are forms of geopower, if power is to be conceived as the engagement of clashing, competing forces . . . Power-the relations between humans, or perhaps even between living things-is a certain, historically locatable capitalisation on the forces of geopower. 98 Within a wider rethinking of geopower we can then resituate what we mean by geopolitics, as a politics of the earth. As I have suggested elsewhere: at its best, such a politics of the earth would take into account the power of natural processes or resources; the dynamics of human and environment; the interrelation of objects outside of human intervention; the relation between the biosphere, atmosphere and lithosphere; and the complex interrelations that produce, continually transform and rework the question of territory and state spatial strategies. 99 givens-an agglomeration of individuals, of houses etc. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all those who live in it'.
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Any adequate theory of terrain will need to be historically informed, and theoretically sophisticated, but it must also aspire to be of use to political and legal practitioners with relation to contemporary examples including sea-ice melt in the Arctic, sea level rise, glaciers, river boundaries and desertification. Territory's materiality encompasses the built and physical landscape and their interrelation. To make sense of this I think we need to develop a political-legal theory of terrain.
